Pakistan’s debate over creating more provinces has returned with unusual force. Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi first declared that the existing governance system had “collapsed” and called for new provinces or administrative units.
More recently, he doubled down, saying that new administrative units would eventually have to be created. The diagnosis deserves attention. Pakistan does suffer from weak governance, poor public services, over-centralisation, fiscal stress and governments increasingly disconnected from citizens. But the proposed cure rests on the doubtful assumption that these failures exist because Pakistan has too few provinces.
If the problem is bad governance, drawing more lines on the map does not automatically produce better government. It can simply reproduce the same weaknesses in smaller jurisdictions, while also adding another layer of political, administrative and fiscal cost.
It is important to acknowledge that the case for new provinces is not entirely frivolous. Southern Punjab has long complained of uneven development. Balochistan’s size makes administration difficult. Karachi’s infrastructure and public services fall far short of a megacity’s needs. Many citizens also understandably feel distant from provincial capitals.
But these are symptoms of weak governance and inadequate devolution, not proof that constitutional surgery is the answer. This ‘cure’ might only end up aggravating the disease.
A province is not an administrative district. It requires a governor, chief minister, cabinet, provincial assembly, chief secretary, inspector general, secretariat, ministries, departments, residences, staff, security, vehicles and, eventually, pensions. Multiplying the number of provinces would permanently expand the political and administrative state at a time when Pakistan desperately needs to reduce the cost of government.
Debt servicing already consumes an extraordinary share of federal resources, development spending is repeatedly squeezed, and taxpayers face an ever-heavier burden. Provincial budgets are dominated by recurring expenditure. In such circumstances, multiplying provincial establishments is difficult to reconcile with fiscal reality.
Pakistan does not suffer from too little government but from too much of the wrong kind. The country’s institutional weaknesses include weak accountability, political interference, fragmented authority, an oversized bureaucracy, duplication between federal and provincial governments, poor rule of law and almost no meaningful performance management.
But would creating more provinces improve election quality, strengthen parliament, professionalise the civil service, boost exports, reduce trade and current account deficits, enhance tax collection or improve regulation and public financial management? Would it make institutions more independent or governments more accountable?
If not, then changing the map is not reform. It simply rearranges the same problems and may even compound them. The experience after the 18th Amendment is instructive. Major responsibilities were devolved from the federation to the provinces, but the restructuring was never completed. The federal government still maintains ministries and institutions in substantially devolved areas, while provinces have often resisted meaningful political, administrative and financial devolution below the provincial level.
Article 140A already requires provinces to establish elected local governments and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility to them. Any reform agenda should therefore focus on making the federation smaller and more strategic and provincial governments leaner and more professional.
Eliminating duplication, rationalising ministries and departments, digitising government, strengthening regulatory and oversight institutions, judging expenditure by outcomes and devolving authority where the constitution already requires it is governance reform. Creating more governments before fixing the ones we have is not.
Pakistan’s provinces are also not mere administrative conveniences. They are constituent political units of the federation and carry historical identities that predate Pakistan itself.
The 1940 Lahore Resolution envisaged Muslim-majority regions enjoying substantial autonomy. In 1943, the Sindh Legislative Assembly became the first legislature in British India to pass a resolution in favour of Pakistan. Elected Muslim representatives from Bengal, Punjab, Sindh, the North-West Frontier Province and elsewhere later helped translate that political demand into statehood.
This history does not make provincial boundaries immutable. The constitution itself permits change but it deliberately makes such change difficult.
Article 239 requires a constitutional amendment to secure two-thirds of the total membership of both houses of parliament. Where the limits of a province are to be altered, the amendment must also be approved by at least two-thirds of the total membership of the affected provincial assembly.
A serious restructuring would also require consequential changes to constitutional provisions governing the territories of Pakistan, representation in the National Assembly and Senate and the composition of provincial assemblies.
This is a restructuring of the federation. So where is the democratic mandate for it?
No political party sought office on a manifesto proposing such a wholesale redrawing of the federation. No national election produced such a mandate, and parliament has not even initiated a serious constitutional debate on the rationale and implications of this proposal. The most forceful advocacy has instead come through speeches and public forums outside parliament.
Sindh’s elected assembly has now unanimously passed a resolution rejecting any proposal to divide the province or alter its territorial limits. That constitutional and political reality cannot simply be wished away.
If Pakistan is ever to reconsider its federal map, the initiative must come through elected representatives, public consent and constitutional process. Declarations that administrative units ‘will have to be created’ or must be made ‘at any cost’ will not cut it.
Once boundaries are opened, the debate will not remain administrative for long. It will immediately involve water, natural resources, assets, liabilities, jobs, universities, hospitals, provincial capitals, NFC shares and Senate representation. Every new province would also alter the balance of the federation as Senate seats are reconsidered, National Assembly representation is redistributed, provincial assemblies are reconstituted and fiscal transfers are recalculated.
What begins as a proposal for ‘administrative efficiency’ would therefore become a far-reaching renegotiation of political power and resources. Even with four provinces, agreement on NFC shares has proved difficult. Imagine the complexity if the number of provinces were multiplied several times over.
Administrative arguments will also quickly become ethnic, linguistic and political disputes. At a time of economic fragility and deep political polarisation, Pakistan should be cautious about simultaneously opening multiple territorial disputes whose consequences cannot be neatly contained.
Our history offers a warning. One Unit was imposed in 1955 in the name of administrative efficiency and national integration. Instead of strengthening the federation, it centralised power and deepened resentment. It was dismantled in 1970, but the political alienation it helped entrench contributed to the wider failure of federal governance that culminated in the catastrophe of 1971.
This is not to say that Pakistan can never alter its internal structure. However, constitutional engineering cannot substitute for political consent, institutional competence and democratic legitimacy.
Pakistan’s crisis is real. But it is a crisis of governance, accountability, legitimacy and institutional capacity and not a shortage of provinces.
The country does not need more governments, capitals, bureaucrats and additional layers of political patronage. What it needs are smaller, more effective governments, stronger institutions, professional civil services, genuine devolution and, above all, democratic accountability.
Governments perform better when those who exercise power know they are answerable to citizens. That is the real reform Pakistan needs but has repeatedly avoided.
Blaming the map for the failures of those who governed it is a convenient diversion. We must fix what exists rather than multiplying dysfunction.
The writer is a former managing partner of a leading professional services firm and has done extensive work on governance in the public and private sectors. He tweets/posts @Asad_Ashah
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer’s own and don’t necessarily reflect Geo.tv’s editorial policy.
Originally published in The News
2026-09-22 09:06:00
