The ink was barely dry on the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) when it ran into difficulties — a painful reminder that peace between the two sides is inherently fragile, always a bullet away from falling apart, and that the strait is likely to remain a sticking point to a long-term Washington-Tehran détente.
Shortly after the US strikes on Iran, President Donald Trump said in a social media post that it was “very possible” that Tehran would “never learn”.
The Islamabad MoU is an interim agreement on the basis of which Iran and the US will negotiate and conclude a final treaty within 60 days (the deadline is extendable), to be endorsed by a binding United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution.
From Tehran’s standpoint, the most important provision of the MoU is that the US will terminate “all types” of sanctions on Iran. The language here is categorical, with no caveats. Until the sanctions are lifted, Washington will grant waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil and petrochemical products. The US will also release the frozen and restricted Iranian funds and, in collaboration with regional partners (Gulf states), put in place a $300 billion plan for economic reconstruction of Iran.
In return, Iran “shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons”. The language here is equally categorical. Iran’s stockpiled enriched uranium will be disposed of in a manner to be agreed by the two countries as part of the final agreement. Until then, Iran will maintain the current status of its nuclear programme, and the US will not impose any new sanctions on Iran; nor will it deploy additional forces in the region.
The MoU outlaws use, or threat of use, of force by the two parties against each other, and commits them to ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon, which in recent years has borne the brunt of Israel’s firepower. The US will terminate the naval blockade of Iran in 30 days, while Iran will make “best efforts” to lift the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and allow free passage of commercial cargo for 60 days. The future administration of the strait will be defined through dialogue between Iran and Oman, in accordance with applicable international law.
It follows that the principal commitment made by Iran in the MoU is not to procure or develop nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of all sanctions by Washington, which over the years has crippled Iranian economy and squeezed the citizens The lifting of sanctions will allow Iran to reintegrate itself into international economy and trade and contribute to removing the most critical reason for the discontent of the people with the Iranian establishment.
Thus, the MoU — should it lead to a final agreement — will be immensely beneficial for both the government and people of Iran. A definitive US-Iran treaty will also provide much-needed assurance to Iran’s Gulf neighbours.
President Donald Trump is being criticised for conceding ‘too much’ to Iran, particularly for committing to ending all sanctions on Iran and promising to launch a multibillion-dollar programme for the country’s economic reconstruction. That said, the critics need to bear in mind that Iran’s commitment on the nuclear question has met Washington’s long-standing demand.
Although Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), under which only those states have the right to maintain nuclear weapons that have manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or another nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967, Americans never trusted that Tehran would abide by its NPT commitment. American sanctions on Iran were primarily devised to prevent it from becoming a nuclear power.
In case Tehran is as good as its word on the nuclear issue, there’s no reason for Washington to continue the sanctions.
Not only that, but the revival of Iran’s economy and its reintegration into international economic and trade regimes will open avenues for the US in terms of both trade and investment. As the second-largest country in the Middle East after Egypt, Iran is a potentially large market for US products.
In particular, Iran’s sanction-hit civil aviation industry, marred by ageing aircraft, holds an attractive prospect for US-based Boeing. I’ve spent a few years in Tehran and am familiar with the high preference among Iran’s urban population for Western goods and services.
How does the Islamabad MoU compare with the JCPOA (better known as the Iran nuclear deal) signed by the Obama administration in 2015? In addition to JCPOA being a final and plurilateral agreement signed by the five de jure nuclear states and the European Union with Iran, the two deals differ on several substantive provisions.
Under the JCPOA, Iran undertook to constrain its nuclear programme under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision in such a manner that it wouldn’t lead to the production of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium.
However, Tehran didn’t commit in express terms that it wouldn’t produce or procure nuclear weapons. It was mainly for this reason that Trump left the JCPOA in his first term.
The other JCPOA signatories gave Iran relief from some, but not from all, of the sanctions. Besides, the lifting of sanctions was made contingent on IAEA reports confirming that Iran was abiding by its part of the bargain. The US suspended its secondary sanctions on Iran, but the primary sanctions remained intact.
The secondary sanctions prevented any third country from doing business with Iran’s sanctioned institutions (such as the central bank and Revolutionary Guards) or enterprises, while the primary sanctions prevented US citizens and US-based enterprises and institutions from doing business with sanctioned Iranian entities. Since the bulk of international transactions use the American dollar, despite the lifting of the secondary sanctions, only a few countries were able to resume normal trading relations with Iran.
The notable difference in the substance of the two agreements is undergirded in the main by different contexts. The JCPOA was the fruit of extensive negotiations done in a peaceful environment. Its text was comprehensive and its sequenced implementation was supposed to spread over several years. On the contrary, the Islamabad MoU is born of a severe crisis — the US-Iran war, which had thrown international energy trade into a tailspin. To close the war, it was necessary for both sides to undertake sweeping commitments immediately through an interim arrangement.
The smooth implementation of the MoU leading to a final deal will remain susceptible to several spoilers. Trump’s occasional rants being only one — and arguably the least important — of these. At the top of these potential spoilers is the reaction of Israel and its strong lobby in Washington, which wants nothing less than complete impoverishment leading to the annihilation of Iran.
In case Israel doesn’t respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon or its powerful supporters in Washington prevail upon the Trump administration to maintain sanctions on Iran, the envisaged treaty may fall apart after some time. As the resumption of US-Iran hostilities brings out, the management of the Strait of Hormuz will remain another sticking point.
The writer is an Islamabad-based columnist. He tweets/posts @hussainhzaidi and can be reached at: [email protected]
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer’s own and don’t necessarily reflect Geo.tv’s editorial policy.
Originally published in The News
2026-07-04 08:59:00
